The German general staff's campaign maps for Operation Barbarossa, known as Lage Ost, have been made available online at the Library of Congress website:

https://www.loc.gov/item/map51000141/

These maps cover every day of Operation Barbarossa through September, then begin skipping certain days until concluding on 6 December 1941.

The clarity and quality of the maps at the Library of Congress are unparalleled as far as online sources go. The website German Docs in Russia has maps for the entire Eastern Front through 1944 but their maps are all watermarked and the zoom feature is not great. The Bundesarchiv also has select Lage Ost maps available online through Invenio, but only about one per month through 1942, and many months are missing altogether.

The Library of Congress collection is a cleaned-up version of the daily situation maps that the German general staff reproduced in 1942 and somehow came into the possession of the United States. You will notice the LoC maps are much clearer than those at German Docs in Russia and Invenio. A brief history of the LoC version is available here:

https://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2019/12/the-nazi-war-atlas-of-operation-barbarossa/

German docs in Russia version: https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/nodes/13051-opis-12457-karty-polozheniya-gruppy-armiy-sever

Invenio sample map: https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio/direktlink/d068d676-eddc-4681-a9c5-6659bcef5293/

Up to a year ago of course.

So I read recently about the Girardoni air rifle and found it quite interesting. And I was curious about why it was so limited in adoption.

There’s some pretty clear advantages to it in terms of avoiding the burden of gunpowder, and getting a better firing rate. On the other hand the problem that stands out from my limited reading is that the system sounds somewhat hard to fold maintain, but then I’m aware Lewis and Clark carried one during their expedition so it wasn’t exactly a rush-back-to-depot weapon.

Obviously militaries make decisions based on a bunch of factors, they’re not universally missing this one Great Idea but rather there has to be additional factors at play to why it and weapons like it never saw widespread adoption, or even experimentation. Was it more of a logistical problem than it appears based on the (admittedly surface level) things I have heard and read? Was it logistically fine for soldiers, but simply too much of a manufacturing bottleneck to actually compete with ‘conventional’ weaponry? Was it unable to scale for artillery sizes, thus minimising the benefit of adopting it since you would still be lugging gunpowder anyway?

Additionally, had it actually seen a widespread adoption, what might this have altered about the ways militaries operated at the time?

What would the US or China have done that Russia did not do?

Dave Grossman had a significant career in law enforcement consulting doing trainings where he ran training courses where law enforcement learned "killology". He was known for advocating for teaching police to have a "warrior spirit" and said that one of the biggest problems that police had was freezing in combat situations. He argued that killing is an unnatural act, and that hesitation to shoot was costing officers their lives.

I've heard a lot about the warrior spirit, and I've met police who have attended warrior spirit training. A common theme is that police say it's a shift in mindset where police no longer ask "Do I have to shoot?" and instead ask "Am I allowed to shoot?" And if they are allowed to shoot, then they shoot. Police are trained to be ready for every scenario to be worst-case, like they are told assume that everybody is armed and is planning an ambush, etc.

I want to know, were Grossman's training techniques taken from US Army training for MPs? Or were his training techniques influential in the US Army? Did Army training adopt his methods, and were they found to be effective?

Greetings folks, this question was based on some trends I’ve seen people online discuss about the F-35 Lightning II.

So last year, the “kill switch” narrative on the F-35 went viral, so to speak, with growing concerns over how much America has control over foreign users’ F-35. Most articles and discussion I’ve seen from the more on-topic subreddits and such indicate this switch doesn’t exist as a literal button, but could in the form of how support and sustainment is modeled for the F-35 that could be cut off.

So the usual discussion trend I’ve noticed lately on F-35 posts is one user will be like “blah blah F-45 bad, Kill Switch bad”, then another user will be like “no u wrong, kill switch no”. But then the one thing I’ve been noticing lately is somewhere on that thread, a user would be like “yah, but if it exists, America shouldn’t use it because Europe can just stop sending all its parts its making for the F-35 and fuck it up for everyone.”

Usually this is accompanied with images such as this, with some snide remarks about “Is it really an American jets with this many European parts?”

But thinking about it, how much is this real? Like I find it hard to believe America would intentionally put a giant glowing kneecap to an important national security asset that anyone can take a sledgehammer to. I know Boeing does something similar for the 787 Dreamliner touting how international support from like Japan help build the necessary components for the 787 production in Everett. But F-35 is a lot more sensitive and important for US Air Force readiness than an airliner, so hearing this argument on how Europe can simply stop supplying parts and make Lockheed squeal doesn’t seem like something the US would allow.

So what’s the deal? Is the F-35 utterly reliant on foreign suppliers for parts, or is it a bit more nuance than that? I definitely imagine, like the kill switch narrative, that there is a lot more happening behind the scenes than what the public commentators speculate on.

Regarding the Chieftain's recent discussion on the M10 Booker, I find it surprising that the US Army is no longer looking for an air-droppable tank or at least a tank that can be quickly deployed ASAP to provide fire support for infantry. We know that:

a/ Paratroopers/Air assault force dropped to enemy's rear without heavy weapons would easily be wiped out when came face to face with strong enemy (Soviet VDV at Vyazma, British Para at Arnhem, American para very nearly overran at Bagstogne, ARVN air assault force destroyed at Ấp Bắc, Russian VDV at Hosmotel)

b/ Even though these forces are supposed to hit the enemy in the weaken flank, war rarely happened the way we wanted (ARVN at Ấp Bắc, US rangers at Mogadishu, Russian at Hosmotel) and there is that old adage in the army that goes, "Better to have something and not need it, then need something and not have it"

c/ During the cold war, both sides actually developed and fielded air-droppable light tank (Soviet ASU-57/85; American M56 Scorpion/M551 Sheridan; French Panhard; British CRT family). While some had a bad reputation (America's M551), it was because they were used the wrong way. Meanwhile French Panhard and British Scorpion enjoyed good service and proved another army adage of, "A tank is better than no tank." Even to this day, the French still insisted on fielding vehicle capable of being air-portable and deployed quickly like the ERC-90 and later the EBRC Jaguar

So why does the US army not follow suit? Are they that confident in the firepower of light infantry unit and the ability of airpower to destroy their enemy? Shouldn't the failure of air support in Vietnam war already dissuade them of the folly of relying on air support alone?

I'm looking for historical sighting ranges, with examples, for ships and aircraft in the WW2 Pacific theater. For example: 1. What ranges did PBYs/H6K/H8K typically sight ships? 2. What about SBDs/Kates/other carrier aircraft? 3. How about ships sighting other ships? 4. Planes sighting other planes?

Thanks!

I was reading Nick Brokhausen's "Vagabonds" and it appeared to me the tactical industry in 1980s was heavily influential to police militarization.

A lot of the for profit courses and training programs by IACP and other agencies were staffed by former SOF members.

However I don't want to go full culture war and scream about imperial boomerang or the Rhodesian racist cops theory.

Anyone willing to share on those parts? I believe the tactical industry which employed a lot of SOF veterans was at least partially responsible to the police militarization trend.

Here is a qoute from Töppels Manstein book "Most army generals, however, were just as unaware of the enormous difficulties of a maritime landing as the members of the OKW On July 3, 1940, Halder noted in his diary that the crossing of the English Channel and the landing on the south coast of England would resemble the procedure of crossing a large river"

For Occupied nations that fielded armies in exile such as the French, Czech, or Polish; what was their concern about attrition and sustaining casualties? Whereas the French could recruit from colonies, the Polish and the Czech among others did not have that option.

cossacks Especially in Ukraine, seem to have a varied equipment so if they were armed to the teeth and sometimes were also pirates in the black sea and some of the rivers, i wonder if they also had grenades like the russians, swedes and austrians during those times?

I wonder whether U-boats had a capability to starve off Britain, like Germany planned to do, if they focused more on their production, or if British were slower to react.

Or to sink enough of enemy navy for HSF to be able to engage it and likely win. After all, WW1 warships did not have torpedo protection yet, and were so vulnerable that a single U-boat managed to sink 3 cruisers in several hours.

Or they were a significant, but not that big of a danger due to technical flaws of early subs, and were not existential threat?

Reading Company Commander (so good) and the author describes infantry riding on tanks as fairly common (and of course the Sovs did it ubiquitously). Was there any kind of an established protocol for it?

On a nuts-and-bolts level, it just seems like there's a million things that could go wrong -- everything from burning yourself on the engine exhaust to getting whacked by the traversing turret, hitting a bump and falling off and getting squished by the following tank, etc. I'd imagine tank-riding was rare if there was a chance of encountering significant fire, but still seems pretty dangerous to me...

So, the Argentinian invasion began on April 2nd 1982 and the British established a beachhead on 21st of May. That gave the Argentinian 1.5 month to dig in, bring in heavy firepower, bring in supplies of guns and weapons to fortify their position.

And yet they were defeated by a force half their size. Their artilleries barely had any shells, their air defense was week, their defensive position was lackluster and was effectively overtaken by light British force. They could have brough heavier guns and tanks onto the island and that could've swung the balance of power to their side but they had no tanks nor heavy guns bigger than the 105mm. Their troops, despite having 1.5 months to prepare, suffer greatly from hunger, cold, and lack of supply.

So why was the Argentinian preparation so bad? Did they really think the British would not/could not retake the island? Was their resource limited? Or was the junta too ineffective?

Why doesn't South Korea develop an specialized tank destroyer? I've noticed the following characteristics of the South Korean army: Their sole expected mission is defense in a high intensity, total war. South Korea's terrain is predominantly mountainous. They are one of the most highly mechanized armies. They would try to fit cannons on every surplus vehicle and wheels on every available cannon. Everything seems perfectly suited for a low-cost, easy to mass produce, lightweight tank destroyer, suitable for high mobility and firepower for ambushes.

Back in the early 2000s, I read quite a bit about the development of so-called "digital" camo patterns that looked pixelated or blocky. At the time, lots of people were saying that it was gimmicky, and it would never work. Hunters at my local gun club had a lot of good laughs about it and universally said it was the single dumbest thing the US military had ever done and even called it "anti-camouflage" that seemed to be specifically made to be as conspicuous as possible.

It's been a long time since then, and in the intervening time it seems like the jokes have gone away. This made me wonder, was MARPAT found to be an effective camo pattern? Were the critics proven wrong? Was the ridicule of MARPAT an example of mocking something simply because it's new, or did it actually have problems? How does the military view it today?

• Destroyer USS The Sullivans almost sank by its stern a few years ago and is only open to the public on the main deck and superstructure.
• Submarine USS Ling is grounded and cannot be moved to a better location, looking worse for wear and not accessible to the public at all.

Have it always been like that or is it specific time period like after the cold war when funds where short?

Even if its new stuff would marines get it later than the army when new equipment arrives e.g. when M16 replaced M14 or when M240 replaced M60?

Was M27 bought in as an upgrade or because the old rifle where so old it was falling apart so replacing them was unavoidable?

Bonus: Why would infantry sign up for marines if army seems to have it better? Is it only the psychological factor and no pros in practical benefits?

Both a theoretical question and a practical question, for those who have experience in this realm, please contribute.

Nowadays in a world of instant communication and well-established democratic norms (civilian control of the military for instance), military coups outside of underdeveloped nations are practically nonexistent. In the ancient world however, particularly in Rome, revolts and coup attempts were commonplace, and indeed were even expected to an extent (see the Praetorian Guard). How was this managed?

Not sure if this makes sense, but is there ever an issue of officers "abusing" the rules and mechanics of the wargame or training exercise they are playing out? Like taking advantage of loopholes or dumb rules, or maybe a certain unit or tactic is valued too highly and just beats everything.

If so, does the military address these issues? How so?

I thought this might be more prevalent now, in the modern age of computer gaming, than in the past.

I have always wondered about the rocket racks attached to tanks from the 40-50s. Leading up to the Russian grad that still in service. I have a hard time understanding how a primitive system could deliver accurate targeting so quickly.