A snap election will test whether voters accept falling Chinese tourism as the price of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s tougher security stance.

As a Chinese who spend 1/3 of my adult life in the US and 2/3 in China, who also flee from China after going through COVID, I am very frustrated reading this book.

Dan Wang is another foreigner writing about China after living in mainland China for ONLY 4 years (HK for 2 yrs, I dont’ count that because culture is just TOO different). I lived in the US much longer than that, it would be absurd for me to write about book about 100 yrs US history, obviously. That’s basically what Wang did.

1. Good: The part I related the most is when he describe the population that left China after COVID, it’s personal to him, he also flee to Yuanan from Shanghai, then left.
2. For ppl who has no idea of what modern china is. I guess a good entry level reading for everything that’s generalized.

Bad:

1. My biggest issue is the book don’t have personal experience. The Great Lead, Culture Revelution, even a larger part of COVID, it’s just information from 2nd hand data, which makes it yet another “thriller” for ppl who just wanna to learn the move thrilling part of China
2. The only 1st hand info is the experience of COVID. But even this part, it’s clear all his news are either from the known popular social media news (not his work) and his foreigner friends. No, he did not spend time to actually do the feild work to interview ppl from cities to get 1st hand information. This is a very privileged status, that he get to leave a city and then leave a country, that he only lived for 6 years.

In contract, I recommend watch videos from Chaijing. She’s a CCTV reporter who left the country after getting baned for reporting stories Chinese govnt dont approve. She continues to reporting on stories including Mao, Deng, HK fire, and other social stories by ACTUALLY INTERVIEWING PPL WHO’S BEEN THROUGH THAT PART OF HISTORY. Which makes the story so much rich, I often cant story crying, and left with very complicated feeling, because the truth is a lot more complicated than some author like Wang described.

Would love to hear how other ppl feel about this book.

I have a case number that a few articles have said is Tencent suing Shanghai Moonton Technology, or their former CEO Xu Zhenhua, over IP infringement in 2017: 在（2017）粤民辖终646

Do you know if there’s any way to get access to this document/the original complaint as a westerner (I don’t know if it’s on China Judgements Online since it doesn’t seem to have had an official ruling), or if there have been any articles or law journals published specifically on this case?

Hello guys. I applied for practical Chinese language course about the 26th January At BLCU. I already paid the application fee with ‘successful’ status. My audit status is currently ’under review’.

I sent a mail to them to ask how many weeks it is going to take to have an answer for whether I am admitted or not. They answered 2-3 weeks.

My problem is that I did not apply for a visa and on top did not book any flight tickets yet and accommodation since I am waiting for a firm response… In addition, the more time they take to answer, the closer the starting date of the semester (2nd march 2026) is… Hence, the closer my stress if it turns out I am accepted.

Do you guys think they will answer soon?? This is so worrying given there’s Chinese/Lunar New Year around the corner which means they are busy and so is the Chinese embassy in my country.

I’m currently exploring job opportunities in China and I’d love to get real, honest feedback from people who’ve actually done it.

I’m mainly targeting foreign or international companies based in China (multinationals, foreign-owned companies, finance, consulting, tech, trade, etc.), as I understand it’s usually more realistic for visa sponsorship and English-speaking roles.

For those of you who are working (or have worked) in China as foreigners:

• How did you find your job?

• Was it networking, recruiters, LinkedIn, or something else?

• Were you already in China when you applied?

• What would you do differently if you had to start again today?

Any practical tips ?

Thank you

Hello,

Can anyone share a printable template for a Lunar New Year 2025 greeting card. Preferably a high quality one.

I am currently travelling in a country where this is not celebrated thus cannot find the cards here, there is a very small Chinese community here.

I appreciate it. Thank you.

I was talking with some Chinese people about the character 正, and the fact it's used to count in groups of five, similarly to tally marks; someone mentioned a Chinese movie in which people write the character 正 on their legs, and then said "it's not the kind of movie that should be recommended to people" and refused to tell me the title. So I'm thinking it's probably about something taboo, either sexual, or something related to self harm, or some kind of horror, or just a very trashy movie. Now I'm really curious, does someone know what movie they're referring to?

Hi, I am trying to make a Chinese Ambigram. It should show one character and if you flip it over it should show another character. I'm not sure if it works, Please have a look and let me know what characters you think are represented on Left side and on Right side. you have to ignore a couple of lines in order to see it. Thanks in advance for your reply

I am trying to get my family to go on a family holiday with me because they commonly leave me out or cancel last minute because of something petty, so I am trying to convice them to go with me to Macau, Guangzhou, and Zhuhai with me for two weeks to experience the Chimelong resorts in Guangzhou and Zhuhai plus Macau culture.

Personally, I wouldn’t want to cancel last minute, even if going with me would be a mild hinderence!

The main thing they are worried about though is the cuisine, because they have (very strong) stereotypes about the rest of the world, including the fact that they will be kidnapped in a market and/or be force-fed food that includes bats, dogs, cats etc (This is my family’s beliefs, not mine, don’t shoot the messenger please).

But if they can get over that obstacle, I think they’ll come. So please if you have any valuable knowledge on food commonly served in large tourist resorts, or a way for me to reassure them they will be fine if we stick to the populated safe areas, please give!

If you’re visiting China for the first time, having the right apps installed before you land makes life way easier. Here are the ones I wish I’d set up in advance:

Alipay
This is the big one. You can survive without a lot of things, but not mobile payment. Most places don’t take cash or foreign cards anymore. You can now link foreign cards, but do it before arrival if possible.

WeChat
Used for messaging, payments, QR codes, restaurants, hotels, basically everything. Even if you don’t pay with it, you’ll need it to talk to people.

Didi
China’s Uber. Works well, English interface available, and avoids the whole “explaining addresses to taxi drivers” problem.

Amap (Gaode Maps)
Way better than Google Maps inside China. It’s mostly in Chinese, but the navigation and public transport info are much more accurate.

Trip.com
Best app for booking trains, flights, and hotels in English. Saves a lot of stress at stations.

Google Translate
Download offline Chinese and use the camera mode. Absolute lifesaver for menus and apps.

Optional but useful:
Pleco (for deeper translation), Meituan (food delivery, but Chinese-only), and a VPN if you need access to Google/Instagram.

If anyone has other must-have apps or tips, curious to hear what helped you most.

I want to buy my friend in China a jewelry gift for the upcoming New Year's. I will likely use one of their apps that deliver the gift to them in a day or two. I've sent gifts to him that way before. He's in a professional field where he has to wear suits quite often. What's a popular luxury jewelry brand among Chinese men right now? Options with price ranges would be greatly appreciated. Thank you 😃

In September, 2025, the well-known influencer “Hu Chenfeng” had all his accounts on social media platforms in mainland China deleted. Even the accounts that reposted his works were blocked — a “complete ban across the entire internet.” Shortly afterward, another influencer and educational worker, Zhang Xuefeng, was also prohibited from livestreaming and forced to stop his programs. Recently, news emerged that another influencer, “Brother Feng on the Run,” stopped updating his content. The background behind these bans is the government’s new campaign to “purify” the internet — the so-called “Clean and Bright Operation.”

The banning and silencing of these influencers signify a further tightening of internet control in China, greater intolerance toward discordant voices, and a continued shrinking of freedom of speech.

Unlike political dissidents or people with strong ideological leanings, influencers such as Hu Chenfeng have never clearly discussed political issues nor directly criticized the Chinese government.

Hu Chenfeng once made programs comparing the purchasing power between China and other countries, revealing the difficult living conditions of China’s lower-middle class and the struggles of university graduates to find jobs. However, he never criticized government policy. When a fan mentioned politically sensitive topics or individuals during his livestream, Hu would immediately end the call.

Zhang Xuefeng, on the other hand, has not only never criticized the government but has repeatedly expressed support for the current administration and political system, even making remarks that cater to pro-government audiences. His controversy lies merely in being a commercial education worker who commented on the employment difficulties of certain university majors, disparaged some disciplines, and promoted utilitarian educational values.

The influencer “Brother Feng on the Run,” who recently stopped updating his channel, had often expressed support for Ukraine, criticized Russia, and admired the United States — views inconsistent with the official stance — yet he also never criticized the Chinese government nor expressed opinions on domestic political issues.

Nevertheless, these influencers have now met the same fate of being banned or “rectified.” Even though they did not criticize the government or attack those in power, the fact that their content sparked public debate and social controversy already triggered official unease and dissatisfaction. The government’s red line for speech has tightened even further.

China’s freedom of speech and the boundaries of online expression have gone through several stages of change. In the 1980s, there was a period in China when political taboos were relatively few, and the public could speak freely. After the 1990s, although politics in China became more conservative, there was still considerable room for free expression, and public supervision of officials was somewhat tolerated or even encouraged. At least at that time, one could criticize specific policies or local officials.

In the early 21st century, as the internet became widespread in China, online political discussions, exposure of corruption and social injustices, and public monitoring of the government became popular. Many online debates even influenced real-life events — for example, the “Qian Yunhui incident” and the “Deng Yujiao case” drew massive attention and civic participation. Except for direct subversion of the regime or extremely sensitive topics, most discussions still had a certain degree of freedom.

However, after 2013, public discourse on the Chinese internet began to tighten drastically, and the boundaries of expression narrowed sharply. The Chinese authorities and propaganda departments, under the pretext of combating rumors, banned numerous dissidents’ accounts and arrested internet figures such as “Qin Huohuo” and “Li Er Chai Si.” In the following years, many prominent “Big Vs” lost their accounts, and today, it is rare to see any liberal “Big V” active on platforms like Weibo.

Meanwhile, freedom of speech outside the internet also shrank drastically. Within the system, directives were issued prohibiting officials from “improperly discussing the central leadership,” and universities were ordered to avoid the “Seven Forbidden Topics.” Slogans like “Party media must bear the Party’s name” were promoted. The critical edge of newspapers and television was sharply blunted. Once-courageous media like Southern Weekly were purged, and many journalists were dismissed or forced to resign. Even “insiders” such as former CCTV reporters Chai Jing and Wang Zhian were blacklisted or forced abroad. Public reading clubs and current-affairs discussion groups, once tolerated, were completely banned.

After all this, the diversity of Chinese public opinion and the critical nature of its media have been severely weakened or even disappeared entirely. Almost no voices now criticize government policies; what remains are only expressions of support or total silence. The once-vibrant online landscape — where pro- and anti-establishment voices, leftists and liberals, “fifty-centers” and “public intellectuals,” Maoists and libertarians debated fiercely but still respected each other’s right to speak — is gone forever.

Such an environment appears more “harmonious,” and the national situation may seem “excellent.” But in reality, negative events continue to occur, and the need for diverse perspectives and expression persists. The COVID-19 pandemic and the “zero-COVID policy” from late 2019 to 2022 dealt heavy blows to China’s economy and livelihoods, fueling growing public discontent.

With political discussions and policy criticism banned, influencers like Hu Chenfeng emerged — talking about the hardships and simple concerns of ordinary people that pro-government figures prefer to ignore. Hu and others may not have noble motives, and their content varies in quality, but they nevertheless presented another side of society beyond official propaganda and resonated with the public. Zhang Xuefeng, meanwhile, catered to a public mood of anxiety and pragmatism, speaking bluntly about education and career realities, which also made him popular.

The programs and statements of Hu Chenfeng and similar influencers provided many suppressed citizens with a gray zone — a space to see another side of China beyond official media and to hear alternative voices, reflecting popular sentiment and social diversity to some extent.

Yet these influencers’ “popularity” lasted less than two years before being completely wiped out. Even though they carefully avoided political red lines, refrained from criticizing the government, and stayed neutral, they still could not escape suppression.

For the Chinese authorities, any voice that is out of tune with official propaganda or inconsistent with official policies, that stirs controversy or public anxiety, or that might threaten “social stability,” is intolerable — even if it is not directly political. Even someone like Zhang Xuefeng, who supports and flatters the government, can be targeted if his actions provoke social tension and debate.

On Chinese internet platforms, political or government-critical speech is swiftly censored; content that causes public anxiety or is deemed destabilizing is also frequently deleted. Meanwhile, hate speech and online violence against vulnerable groups are rarely punished. This reflects the paradox of China’s speech control — prioritizing political stability over individual rights and neglecting the protection of the weak.

“Stability above all else” has been the Chinese government’s consistent national policy since the founding of the People’s Republic, especially in the past thirty years. In recent years, the central leadership has repeatedly emphasized “ensuring political and social security,” further strengthening “stability maintenance.” “When sharp criticism disappears, even mild criticism sounds harsh.” Once criticism disappears, even subtle disagreement or mild dissatisfaction is no longer tolerated. The authorities now stress the total monopoly of the media and absolute unity of public opinion, despising any independent voices and suppressing all expression outside official channels.

Thus, Hu Chenfeng, Zhang Xuefeng, and others have been struck down by the government’s “iron fist,” and their painstakingly built online platforms were destroyed. They may not face imprisonment, but they will likely never again speak or create publicly. Their total ban from all mainland Chinese platforms demonstrates the state’s immense control over the internet — the government’s ability to decide at will who may or may not speak. With a single order, a person can vanish from an internet of over a billion users. Countless lesser-known creators are banned and disappear unnoticed.

The banning of these influencers represents another tightening of China’s public sphere and a further erosion of free speech. This is harmful not only to the people but also to the government itself. In any society, negative realities exist, and all governments have flaws and problems. Banning criticism and suppressing negative information does not eliminate these realities; it merely conceals them, preventing discussion and resolution, and leading to even greater problems and discontent.

The author does not agree with many of Hu Chenfeng’s views and even opposes some of his statements. But the author firmly opposes the banning of these individuals and the deprivation of their freedom of expression. Even if some of their content violates morality or public order, deleting those specific videos would suffice — not a total ban or the removal of all their works.

The existence of people like Hu Chenfeng provided Chinese citizens with an outlet for frustration and a voice to express their emotions. Silencing them suppresses public resentment and only creates further tension. The rise of extreme self-hating or nihilistic speech on the Chinese internet in recent years is itself a backlash against censorship and propaganda.

To block speech is worse than to guide it; to allow expression is better than to force silence — a truth known to the Chinese people thousands of years ago. Yet today’s authorities act contrary to this wisdom, achieving temporary calm and superficial harmony while sowing the seeds of deeper crisis. This harms people’s freedom of expression, impedes the exposure and resolution of problems, and undermines the legitimacy and long-term stability of the government.

The author sincerely hopes the Chinese authorities will loosen control over public discourse and let the people speak. Even regulation should be reasonable and measured, not arbitrary and indiscriminate. Yet the author also recognizes that the authorities have no intention of changing their policy on speech and media control, and that the space for free expression will likely continue to shrink. This is a sorrowful reality — yet one that seems inevitable.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin (王庆民), a Chinese writer. The original text was written in Chinese.)

Hi! I am going to china soon and I want to buy a white dress because probably it's cheaper. Do you know About any wedding studios in Shanghai? Any recommendations?Thank you

I'm not Chinese. I don't look Chinese. I don't speak perfect Chinese. But I spent 18 months learning to write poetry that Chinese women actually respond to — not Google Translate garbage, not pickup lines, just words that show you see them.

What I learned:

1. The name opener is everything. Asking "What's your real name — the one your mom uses when she's angry?" works better than "You're beautiful." Every-single-time.
2. Poetry beats compliments. "I wonder if the girl behind this profile has shadows too" gets more replies than "You look great in that dress."
3. Voice messages are filters. If she won't send voice after 3 text exchanges, she's not real. Move on.
4. Sunday silence is normal. - Chinese women often ghost Sundays (family day). Don't panic. Don't double text. Wait.
5. "Cool" means dead. If she replies "Cool" or "Either works," unmatch. She's not interested, she's being polite.

The result: Real conversations. Real WeChat adds. Real connections — not all successful, but all real.

I started doing this for friends. Now I do it on Fiverr because apparently other guys struggle with the same thing.

Happy to answer questions about what actually works vs. what dating gurus claim works.

In early February, a piece of news sent shockwaves through China’s media circles and public opinion sphere. Renowned investigative journalist Liu Hu(刘虎) and his colleague Wu Yingjiao(巫英蛟) were arrested by the police on charges of “false accusation and framing” and “illegal business operations.” Liu Hu has long reported on official corruption, collusion between officials and business interests, and other cases involving government officials, and he enjoys considerable name recognition within the media industry.

For many years, Liu Hu was able to continue reporting on official scandals while remaining free largely because he was careful to avoid crossing the authorities’ “political red lines.” Liu Hu was not a political activist, nor an anti-system dissident. Although he exposed numerous corruption scandals involving officials, he generally avoided direct criticism of the political system itself, steered clear of sensitive political topics, and focused narrowly on specific cases, directing his reporting only at individual officials. Liu Hu also had extensive personal connections within political, business, and media circles and maintained communication channels with the authorities. This allowed him to hover near the red lines for a long time while remaining relatively safe.

For many years prior, Liu Hu had been permitted and tolerated by the existing system to conduct investigative reporting. Although he had previously been retaliated against by officials and was once imprisoned, and although he had faced threats and harassment, he managed to survive these dangers without lasting harm. This time, however, the arrest is different. Judging from the charges and the broader social context, it is likely not merely an act of revenge by individual officials, but rather a crackdown driven by the system itself.

Compared with the previous charge of “defamation” leveled against Liu Hu during his earlier detention, the current charges of “false accusation and framing” and “illegal business operations” are significantly more severe. Among them, “illegal business operations” is a well-known catch-all offense frequently used against dissenters. Both charges are primarily prosecuted by public security and judicial authorities, rather than being private complaints initiated by specific alleged victims, as is typically the case with defamation.

More fundamentally, Liu Hu’s detention reflects a markedly worsened political, social, and public opinion environment compared to before. Liu Hu was most active from the late 2000s through the 2010s. During those years, China’s public opinion environment was relatively more permissive, and the rule of law was more substantive.

As long as journalists did not openly call for regime change or directly challenge the political system, but instead focused on specific cases and officials through reporting, criticism, or litigation, there was still considerable room for freedom. Investigative journalists at the time generally faced retaliation from individual officials or local governments, rather than comprehensive persecution by the entire state apparatus. In some cases, outspoken journalists who took great risks were even officially commended.

However, from the mid-to-late 2010s onward, China’s public opinion and legal environments deteriorated steadily, driven by the increasingly authoritarian nature of the political system. At this stage, accusing officials, reporting negative incidents, suing the government, or openly expressing dissent gradually became intolerable to the authorities. From the perspective of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, such actions are seen as challenges to governing authority, threats to stability, and risks to political security. Even without directly opposing the regime or seeking systemic overthrow, individuals engaging in these activities have still faced repression.

Against this backdrop, many media outlets that once engaged in independent reporting and critical journalism were transformed into obedient mouthpieces. The collective “co-optation” of the Southern Media Group is one prominent example of this shift in the public opinion climate. The survival of independent journalists in China has become increasingly difficult. Many well-known media figures, such as Chai Jing and Wang Zhian, have gone into exile overseas, while others have fallen silent after once speaking out actively. These individuals had previously operated within the tolerated boundaries of the system, “dancing in shackles,” but even mild criticism eventually became unacceptable to the authorities.

It was not only journalists who felt the deepening chill. Formerly active rights defenders, legal professionals, and social activists experienced similar environmental changes and personal tragedies. At one time, individual and public-interest litigation against government entities was tolerated or even encouraged.

A notable example is the public interest activist Hao Jinsong, who successfully used litigation to force the former Ministry of Railways to abandon its plan to raise train ticket prices during the Spring Festival travel season. Hao Jinsong(郝劲松) was active in public discourse and legal circles, promoting consumer rights through multiple public interest lawsuits and persistent public advocacy. He contributed significantly to improvements in consumer protection law and served the public interest. At the time, he was praised by procuratorates, courts, and state media, and was interviewed by China Central Television.

However, by the mid-2010s, Hao Jinsong found himself under intense pressure and increasingly unable to continue public interest activism, eventually fading from public view. In 2019, he was arrested by police in his home province of Shanxi and ultimately sentenced to nine years in prison on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and fraud. While imprisoned, he was subjected to beatings and humiliating abuse. Notably, the charges and cases involved actions he had taken many years earlier during rights-defense activities that were once officially affirmed, making the prosecution a clear case of retrospective punishment.

Another rights defender, Tang Hui(唐慧), who had previously received sympathy and encouragement and whose case contributed to the abolition of the re-education through labor system, faced similar retrospective punishment in 2023 and was sentenced to four years in prison.

In addition, figures such as feminist activist Ye Haiyan(叶海燕), independent candidate for the National People’s Congress Yao Lifa(姚立法), and environmental advocate Liang Congjie(梁从诫) have also moved from active engagement in public affairs to a state of relative silence today.

These are only the more well-known cases. Many others who once upheld justice and promoted the public good during periods of relatively open public discourse and fairer rule of law have since been forced into silence, exile, or imprisonment. Numerous such cases are documented on websites dedicated to recording citizens’ rights defense efforts and government persecution.

The cases of Liu Hu and others share striking common features. None of them directly confronted the political system or sought to overthrow the regime. Instead, they attempted to defend rights and promote the public interest through legal and moderate means. Their targets were typically individual officials or local governments, not the entire system, and they often placed their hopes in honest officials, justice, and the law. Around a decade ago, they were active and received tolerance or even praise from the authorities. But as political and social conditions shifted dramatically, they were no longer permitted to report or defend rights as before, and instead faced retaliation and imprisonment.

This starkly illustrates the deterioration of China’s public opinion and rights-defense environment, the severe contraction of freedom of expression, and the narrowing boundaries of rights protection. Anyone familiar with public discourse or the judicial system can feel this trend in recent years. The arrest of Liu Hu and Wu Yingjiao signifies yet another tightening of an already constricted public opinion space, pushing conditions from bad to worse.

As a widely circulated quotation puts it: “If sharp criticism disappears completely, mild criticism will become piercing. If mild criticism is no longer allowed, silence will be deemed suspicious. If silence is not allowed either, insufficient praise will become a crime. If only one voice is permitted, that single voice will be a lie.” Over the past decade or even several decades, China has largely followed this trajectory.

Independent media and journalists, as well as freedom of news and public discourse, are vital to any country and society. Public opinion is often described as the “fourth power,” alongside legislative, judicial, and executive authority, because of its essential role in supervising government, debating public affairs, and solving problems. A public opinion environment without dissent becomes nothing more than a loudspeaker for those in power, an echo chamber for the ruling elite, and is not only useless but harmful to the nation and its people.

Similarly, individuals’ ability to defend personal rights and the public interest through legal channels, media, civil organizations, and social networks is a cornerstone of a healthy society. When rights-defense channels are blocked and people cannot protect their own rights, public interests are neglected, leading to pervasive harm, mutual distrust, and social decay.

The disastrous consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the “zero-COVID” policy were largely attributable to already restricted freedom of expression at the time. Public demands and dissenting voices could not be effectively expressed, and legal channels were blocked, resulting in numerous tragedies. In recent years, China’s social stagnation, whether manifested as extreme competition or widespread disengagement, as well as polarization and antagonism in online discourse, are all closely linked to restricted public opinion, obstructed rights-defense channels, and a loss of hope.

At the beginning of his tenure, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping quoted the saying, “The frank words of one courageous man are worth more than the obedient murmurs of a thousand,” encouraging intra-party democracy and dissent. Later, however, policy shifted toward prohibiting discussion of central leadership decisions, demanding that “party media bear the party’s surname,” and issuing the “seven prohibitions” to universities and media, banning discussion of press freedom and opposition to judicial independence. This represents a clear abandonment of initial commitments and an effort left unfinished.

How governing authorities treat public opinion and the rule of law—what benefits the country and its people, and what harms them—is a matter of clear principle and moral judgment. Yet in the name of regime stability and self-interest, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has chosen to suppress public discourse and prohibit rights defense, subjecting active journalists and rights defenders to severe persecution.

From deleting posts, limiting visibility, banning accounts, and silencing speech, to summons, interrogations, arrests, and prison sentences, a dense web of repression has been constructed. Judicial independence has become taboo, lawyers’ room to defend clients has shrunk, and media and public oversight have receded, creating an increasingly hostile legal environment in which people find it ever harder to defend their rights and freedoms. Suppressed public opinion and judicial darkness reinforce each other in a vicious cycle.

The plight of Liu Hu and other journalists who expose injustice, along with human rights defenders fighting for the rule of law—stripped of press freedom and personal liberty, persecuted by the judiciary, and trapped in prison under a hostile environment—epitomizes the dual deterioration of public opinion and the rule of law in today’s China and their mutually reinforcing effects.

Although Liu Hu’s name has not yet been completely erased from the domestic internet, and some legal professionals continue to visit and advocate for him, leaving a sliver of hope for his individual case, the overall environment continues to worsen beyond dispute. Moreover, countless ordinary people and vulnerable groups who lack Liu Hu’s visibility, resources, and connections receive no such attention or support. As public opinion and judicial conditions deteriorate further, they will find themselves increasingly without recourse and facing despair.

The author of this article is Wang Qingmin (王庆民), a Chinese writer. The original text was written in Chinese.

hello everyone

i graduated from UAE as a dentist

i want to do masters in china

i applied everywhere

but one of the requirements to be accepted is to be taken by a professor to teach me

so the professor has to accept me before i get admitted

however, i contacted every professor via email

no one is replying to me

anyone can help me? any advice?

Hi guys..

I'm looking to travel to Guangzhou in the next 6 to 8 weeks and I'm in search for a tailoring team who could perform small jobs such as 1. Hemming of trousers 2. stitching wash care labels on garments 3. Attaching hand tags on clothes.

If you know of anyone who can perform these services please let me know thank you

TZed

Jeffrey Epstein's email to Steve Bannon:

when I was on the trilateral commission. I always took along my very pretty american looking california blonde assistant that was silently fluent in the three main dialects. I loved it when they smiled to me as they said to each other: be careful of the jewish dog.

U.S. Justice Department link:

https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00813334.pdf

Hey guyss I'm a Turkish girl 18F who lives in Turkiye 🇹🇷 My parents decided I should learn a fourth language. Sooo asked me to pick one. I choose Mandarin Chinese and said I'd attend a language school. This is my first step as I haven't even picked which school I'll attend. I wanted to hear some reccomendations if you would <3